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This article provides a concise history of the Doha Round negotiation, analyzes 
its deadlock, and offers some suggestions for a successful Doha deal and for 
developing countries.  The article observes that the nearly decade-long negotiation 
stalemate is symptomatic of diametrically opposed perceptions of the nature of the 
Round between developed and developing countries.  While developed countries 
appear to be increasingly oblivious to Doha’s original genesis, developing countries 
vehemently condemn their narrow commercial focus in the Doha Round talks.  It will 
not be easy to untie this Gordian knot since both developed and developing countries 
tend to think that no deal is better than a bad deal.  This political dilemma 
notwithstanding, the current global economic crisis has been a clarion call for a 
successful Doha deal.  Ironically, the widespread protectionist reactions from both 
developed and developing countries have highlighted the vital importance of a well-
operating multilateral trading system.  This article concludes that the United States 
must exercise leadership in delivering the Doha Round and that developing countries 
must embrace open trade more vigorously beyond the Doha Development Agenda. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 29, 2008, Pascal Lamy, the head of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), bitterly declared the collapse of yet another attempt to conclude the Doha 
Round talks.1  Even his eleventh-hour Herculean effort to bridge the differences 
among the major negotiating groups was of no avail.  As of March 2010, after nine 
years of talks, the Doha Round still has no framework (modalities) deal, let alone 
final national schedules.2  A recidivistic pattern of collapses and resumptions in the 
negotiation process has fostered a sense of defeatism and learned helplessness 
among delegates.  As such, the 2008 collapse was not entirely alien; it was just a 
recurring scene from the past.  Because of the economic and political circumstances 
of the past several years, as well as the underlying lack of political will or capital 
among WTO members, the successful resolution of the Doha Round undoubtedly 
remains a “tough sell.”3  As the Doha Round has become the longest trade round in 
GATT/WTO history, its current torpor may only be broken by an epic catastrophe. 
This nearly decade-long negotiation stalemate is attributable to the 
diametrically opposed perceptions of the Round between developed and developing 
countries.  Developed countries appear to be increasingly oblivious to the original 
reasons for Doha’s creation:  to foster a development round launched in response to 
the urgency of the September 11 terrorist attacks and the UN Millennium 
 
1. Pascal Lamy, Director-General of the World Trade Organization, DG Press Conference (July 
2008) (transcript available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news08_e/2008_07_29_pc_lamy_e.doc). 
2. The most recent WTO Ministerial Conference, held in Geneva in December 2009, delivered no 
breakthrough on the Doha Round negotiation. See Chairman’s Summary, WT/MIN(09)/18 (Dec. 2, 2009) 
(reviewing the accomplishments of the Ministerial Conference); Jonathan Lynn, No Doha Decision from 
Meeting, REUTERS, Nov. 27, 2009, http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE5AQ1ZP20091127?sp=true 
(recapping the conclusion that there will be no decision on the long-standing Doha Round). 
3. Stephen Castle & Mark Landler, After 7 Years, Talks on Trade Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2008, 
at A1. 
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Development Goals (MDGs).4  These countries, such as the United States and those 
of the EU, tend to consider the advancement of the Doha Round to be a liability 
rather than a goal.  Ascribing to the Doha crisis its uncommon development label for 
a trade round, developed countries realized that “with a narrow agenda centered on 
giving market access to poor countries, little incentive was offered to the leading 
trading nations to compromise.”5 This position tends to regard any concessions in 
agricultural liberalization as potential bargaining chips to be exchanged squarely for 
reciprocal concessions from developing countries.  Of course, developed countries’ 
main target is not the world’s poorest countries, but emerging countries such as 
India, Brazil, and China.  Developed countries thus condition their reduction of farm 
protection on these emerging countries’ matching reduction of industrial tariffs.  This 
is why the Obama administration still believes that the most recent Doha package is 
“imbalance[d].”6 
Developing countries, however, condemn this narrow commercial focus.  To 
developing countries, Doha should not be yet another Wall Street deal.  Principally, 
developing countries view the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) as an avenue for 
reducing or eliminating old, unfair protection by developed countries that the 
skewed Uruguay Round deal failed to resolve.  In this context, developing countries 
perceive developed countries’ consistent quid pro quo demands as unconscionable 
derelictions of Doha’s development mandate.  Even emerging economies argue that 
they should be granted more “policy space” than developed countries in cutting 
industrial tariffs, given the former’s limited institutional capability.7 
In sum, WTO members are split between two diametrically opposed worlds.  
This philosophical divergence on the nature of the Doha Round is the main culprit 
for the negotiation deadlock.  It will not be easy to untie this Gordian knot since 
both worlds tend to think that no deal is better than a bad deal.8  A new geography 
of power defined by the recent rise of emerging economies has also contributed to 
this deadlock.9  Under these circumstances, the Doha Round may be relegated to 
 
4. In the Doha Ministerial Declaration of 2001, WTO members highlighted that “the majority of 
WTO members are developing countries” and agreed to “place [developing countries’] needs and interests 
at the heart of the Work Programme adopted in this Declaration.”  World Trade Organization, Ministerial 
Declaration of 14 November 2001, para. 2, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha 
Declaration].  Some commentators observe that the “grand-scale agreements format” became “obsolete.”  
Alan Beattie, Doha Hangovers But No Anger Next Morning, FIN. TIMES, July 30, 2008, available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3e4f0e12-5e56-11dd-b354-000077b07658.html?nclick_ check=1 [hereinafter 
Doha Hangovers] (quoting Susan Schwab, U.S. Trade Representative).  Yet the innovative negotiation 
procedures (“concentric circles”) espoused by the WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy proved to be 
effective in gathering convergences.  World Trade Organization, The July 2008 Package—Seeking 
Consensus, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/ meet08_circles_popup_e.htm# (last visited Feb. 6, 
2010). 
5. Editorial, The Next Step for World Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2008, at A14. 
6. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, THE PRESIDENT’S TRADE POLICY 
AGENDA FOR 2009, at 3 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 Trade Policy Agenda]. 
7. World Trade Organization Secretariat, Developmental Aspects of the Doha Round of Negotiations, 
in AGREEING AND IMPLEMENTING THE DOHA ROUND OF THE WTO 41, 49 (Harald Hohmann ed., 2008) 
[hereinafter AGREEING AND IMPLEMENTING]. 
8. See, e.g., U.S. Presses WTO for Details on Doha Round Benefits, REUTERS, Apr. 14, 2009, 
http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-39048220090415 (reporting that U.S. business groups are pressuring 
the Obama administration not to agree on the current form of the Doha deal). 
9. See, e.g., BRIC Makes Formal Debut with First Summit Meeting, XINHUA, June 14, 2009, available 
at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-06/14/content_11541582.htm (observing that the rapid economic 
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inconvenience, irrelevance, or incorrectness as far as politicians of both worlds are 
concerned. 
The political dilemma notwithstanding, the current global economic crisis has 
offered a clarion call for a successful Doha deal.  Ironically, the widespread 
protectionist reactions from both developed and developing countries alike have 
highlighted the vital importance of a well-operating multilateral trading system.10  
Moreover, the fact that the crisis tends to victimize the poor in a highly 
disproportionate manner has also amplified the original mission for a development 
round.11  In this regard, the Doha Round urgently needs to change its rhetoric of 
negotiation from a narrowly defined commercial deal to a broad, collective public 
good.  WTO members should deem the Doha Round as a Gemeinschaftian 
enterprise in which they share a communitarian ethos and identity, not as a mere 
Gesellschaftian set of mercantilist bargains.12  After all, the DDA is not as much of a 
consequentialist balance sheet as it is a teleological commitment. 
Markedly, this is the moment of truth for the U.S. leadership, which can help 
crystallize the DDA into a concrete outcome as it overcomes many political hurdles, 
domestic and international.  As Charles Kindleberger aptly observed more than 
three decades ago, the lack of U.S. leadership contributed greatly to the deepening 
of the Great Depression.13  Now in the face of the biggest crisis since the Great 
Depression, what the global economic system truly needs is “a country which is 
prepared . . . to set standards of conduct for other countries; and to seek to get 
others to follow them, to take on an undue share of the burdens of the system.”14 
At the same time, however, developing countries should not anticipate a 
panacea for development from the DDA.  With or without the Doha Round, 
developing countries, in particular low-income developing countries, should take 
active development initiatives on their own terms.  Developing countries should first 
realize that the conventional WTO development mantras, such as the special and 
differential (S&D) treatment, may not benefit them much in practice.  In addition to 
the fact that its developmental potential is empirically doubted, it may implicitly 
provide developed countries with subterfuges for deviations from free trade 
 
growth of BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) has led them to “reposition” themselves in the 
international sphere). 
10. See Steven Mufson, WTO Seeks to Curtail Protectionist Measures, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2009, at 
D03 (detailing many of the protectionist measures taken by China, India, and the United States); WTO 
Chief:  Multilateral Trading System to Face “Stress Test,” GLOBAL TIMES, May 27, 2009, available at 
http://business.globaltimes.cn/world/2009-05/432914.html (“‘It is precisely at this time, when protectionist 
temptations flourish, that the value of the multilateral trading system is all the more apparent to all [of] us’ 
. . . .”). 
11. See Mark Landler, Dire Forecast for Global Economy and Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2008, at B1 
(highlighting the disproportionate impact of the downturn on developing nations); Pascal Lamy, We Must 
Seal the Deal on World Trade, GUARDIAN, Nov. 23, 2009, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/nov/23/world-trade-doha-round-deal (observing that 
export earnings by the world’s poorest countries have dropped by 44% since the onset of the global 
financial crisis and that the “Doha deal represents one of the most valuable tools at our disposal to help 
meet the United Nations’ millennium development goals”). 
12. See generally Sungjoon Cho, The WTO’s Gemeinschaft, 56 ALA. L. REV. 483, 541 (2004) 
[hereinafter Cho, Gemeinschaft] (“[T]he WTO Gesellschaft has not been, and should not be, an answer.  
Only global empathy realized through the achievement and operation of the WTO Gemeinschaft . . . can 
deliver true changes.”). 
13. CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, THE WORLD IN DEPRESSION 1929–1939, at 297–98 (1973). 
14. Id. at 28. 
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principles, such as tariff peaks.  In the long term, developing countries should 
mainstream open trade more aggressively as their primary developmental avenue. 
Against this backdrop, this article provides a concise history of the Doha 
Round negotiation, analyzes its deadlock, and offers some suggestions for a 
successful deal as well as for developing countries in general.  Part II sketches the 
inglorious history of the Doha Round’s nine years of stalled negotiations.  It reveals 
a deep-rooted tension between developed and developing countries on the nature of 
the Doha Development Round.  Part III determines why the nine-year negotiations 
have failed to secure a deal thus far; it critically observes that a confluence of 
underlying North-South tensions and other political factors adverse to the 
negotiations led to the current stalemate.  Part IV characterizes the Doha failure as 
the WTO’s legitimacy crisis:  such failure will cause disproportionate harms to 
developing countries, accounting for more than three quarters of the WTO 
membership, which have already suffered from the current global financial crisis.  
Part V then suggests that developed countries, in particular the United States, 
mobilize more political capital to deliver a Doha success and that developing 
countries mainstream open trade as their primary developmental tool beyond 
Doha’s promises. 
II. THE HISTORY OF THE DOHA ROUND:  AN INGLORIOUS TALE 
A. The Genesis of a Development Round 
The Doha Round began its existence amid a grim atmosphere after the 
September 11 terrorist attacks and global economic woes.15  To signal a collective 
commitment to open trade and prosperity, in particular toward poor countries, the 
Round was established at the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference held in Doha, 
Qatar in November 2001.  As a development round, the DDA’s main concern was to 
reduce or eliminate agricultural trade barriers, such as farm subsidies and farm 
tariffs, which rich countries had maintained after the launch of the WTO.16  The level 
of urgency in the international community at the DDA’s inception enabled 
negotiators to nail down an ambitious deadline of January 1, 2005 as the date for 
completing the Doha Round.17 
Importantly, the South expected to redeem the unbalanced deal that it had 
suffered as a result of the Uruguay Round, because the new round highlighted the 
development dimension of trade.18  The emergence of a new geography of power 
 
15. See William A. Lovett, Bargaining Challenges and Conflicting Interests:  Implementing the Doha 
Round, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 951, 958 (2002) (documenting how the September 11 terrorist attacks led 
to the creation of the Doha Round). 
16. See Doha Declaration, supra note 4, para. 13 (“Building on the work carried out to date and 
without prejudging the outcome of the negotiations we commit ourselves to comprehensive negotiations 
aimed at:  substantial improvements in market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of 
export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support.”). 
17. See id. paras. 42, 45 (setting a deadline of early 2005 and noting the seriousness of concerns facing 
least-developed countries). 
18. J. Michael Finger, Trade and Development:  Systematic Lessons from WTO Experience with 
Implementation, Trade Facilitation, and Aid for Trade, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL 
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within the WTO, exemplified by China’s recent accession to membership, seemed to 
reinforce this development mandate in the Doha Round.19  As negotiations 
proceeded, however, the Round’s original development goals could not match the 
tough business realities on the ground.  Developed countries’ governments simply 
lacked the political capital to bring the development cause to light without obtaining 
serious concessions from developing countries.  This lack of political will in 
developed countries to accommodate developing countries’ interests had also 
eventually derailed the Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999.20 
B. Collapses and Missed Deadlines 
The fanfare of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún, Mexico in 
September 2003 quickly turned into a disgraceful tumult of infuriation and finger-
pointing.  According to the original plan, the Cancún Conference was supposed to 
deliver a basic deal on the modalities (framework) requiring WTO members to open 
their markets in implementing the DDA by the end of 2004.  Yet major developed 
countries were simply not prepared to reform their long-standing agricultural 
protection policies to meet such ambition.  Some observed that the $180 billion U.S. 
farm bill and the EU’s refusal to reform its outmoded Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), led by a Franco-German collusion, made a “mockery of the idea that the 
Doha round was to be a development round.”21  In a frustrating testimony to rich 
countries’ farm protectionism, the United States refused to reduce its notorious 
cotton subsidies, even in the face of desperate pleas from Africa’s Cotton Four 
(Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali) and then-WTO Director-General Supachai.22  
One representative of the cotton industry decried that “[w]e are used to hardship, 
disease and famine . . . .  Now the WTO is against us as well.  I think that this will 
stay in history.”23 
After the Cancún debacle, the Doha trade talks were largely deadlocked until 
the summer of 2004 when negotiators managed to work out the July 2004 Package.  
This Package was nothing but the modality of modalities.  It contained the basic 
principles and framework for establishing the modalities in future negotiations.  For 
example, the July 2004 Package adopted a tiered approach to reducing farm 
subsidies and tariffs, which required that a member with a higher level of trade-
distorting agricultural subsidies and agricultural tariffs cut its subsidies and tariffs to 
 
SYSTEM 75, 87–90 (Chantal Thomas & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009). 
19. Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge Too Far:  The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún 
and the Future of Trade Constitution, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 219, 234–35 (2004) (discussing the dramatic impact 
of the “China factor” on the power of the G-21 at the Cancun Ministerial Conference). 
20. WORLD BANK, GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND POVERTY:  BUILDING AN INCLUSIVE WORLD 
ECONOMY 60 (2002) (quoting Report Commissioned by the Secretary-General, Recommendations of High-
Level Panel on Financing for Development, at 7 (June 22, 2001)). 
21. Trading Insults, ECONOMIST, Nov. 30, 2002, at 67.  See also Coming Unstuck, ECONOMIST, Nov. 2, 
2002, at 14 (explaining the failure of the United States and Europe to make good on their pledges to 
disable their farm support programs). 
22. At the Eleventh Hour, Divergence All Over Again, BRIDGES DAILY UPDATE (Int’l Ctr. for Trade 
and Sustainable Dev.), Sept. 14, 2003, http://ictsd.org/downloads/2008/08/ben030914.pdf.  See generally 
Kevin C. Kennedy, The Doha Round Negotiations on Agricultural Subsidies, 36 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 
335, 343 (2008) (demonstrating that cotton subsidies in rich countries have driven down the prices of cotton 
in the global market). 
23. At the Eleventh Hour, Divergence All Over Again, supra note 22. 
10 Cho PUB 3/24/2010 5:50:15 PM 
2010] DEMISE OF DEVELOPMENT IN DOHA NEGOTIATIONS 579 
 
a higher degree.24  In the reduction of industrial tariffs, developing countries would 
have longer implementation periods as well as some flexibility in choosing tariff lines 
to cut.25 
Nonetheless, the July 2004 Package failed to motivate WTO members to 
further narrow differences in their substantive positions.  The revised plan for the 
Doha Round was to achieve some concrete approximation of the members’ 
substantial differences on critical issues—such as the size of the reduction of farm 
subsidies and tariffs—by July 2005, and then to deliver a deal on the modalities in 
the upcoming Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in December 2005.26  Under this 
scenario, WTO members might have finalized the whole round by the end of 2006.27  
Yet the political climate was not ripe for the so-called July Approximation.28  Having 
failed to resolve their differences, WTO members lowered their expectations for the 
Hong Kong Ministerial Conference.29 
These recalibrated expectations naturally led to a largely face-saving pact in 
Hong Kong.30  The Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration included some meaningful 
numbers, such as deadlines for getting rid of agricultural export subsidies (2013)31 
and cotton export subsidies (2006),32 as well as a developmentally critical 
commitment that the exports of least developed countries (LDCs) enjoy duty and 
quota-free access, at least up to 97 percent, by 2008.33  The positive view of the Hong 
Kong deal is that it put the Doha Round “back on track” with a “rebalancing in the 
favour of developing countries.”34 At the same time, however, the negative view of 
the deal was that it failed again to deliver the long-awaited deal on modalities for the 
agricultural and non-agricultural market access (NAMA) sector.35  Negotiators 
simply deferred resolving this controversial issue and agreed that they would 
establish the modalities by April 30, 2006.36 
 
24. World Trade Organization, Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, Annex A, 
WT/L/579 (Aug. 2, 2004). 
25. Id. Annex B. 
26. WTO Members Aim for July ‘Approximations,’ Hong Kong Deal, 9 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE 
NEWS DIG. (Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev.), Feb. 16, 2005, available at 
http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/7683/. 
27. Id. 
28. Alan Beattie, G8 Mood and Doha Talks ‘Show Disconnect,’ FIN. TIMES, July 8, 2005, at 4. 
29. Members Scale Back Expectations for Hong Kong, 9 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. (Int’l 
Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev.), Nov. 9, 2005, at 1, available at 
http://ictsd.net/downloads/bridgesweekly/bridgesweekly9-38.pdf; Dark Clouds Over Doha, ECONOMIST, 
Nov. 10, 2005, http://www.economist.com/agenda/displaystory.cfm?story_id=5134656&fsrc=nwl. 
30. See, e.g., Richard Waddington, WTO Seeks Face-Saving Pact to Keep Talks Moving, REUTERS, 
Dec. 13, 2005 (explaining that the conference’s objectives were tempered from producing a draft free-trade 
treaty to providing special aid for poorer countries). 
31. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration Adopted on 18 December 2005, para. 6, 
WT/MIN(05)/DEC, (2005) available at http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/minist_e/min05_e/ 
final_text_e.htm. 
32. Id. para. 11. 
33. Id. Annex F. 
34. World Trade Organization, Day 6:  Ministers Agree on Declaration that ‘Puts Round Back on 
Track,’ (Dec. 18, 2005), http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/min05_18dec_e.htm. 
35. Id. 
36. Sungjoon Cho, Half Full or Half Empty?:  The Hong Kong WTO Ministerial Conference Has 
Delivered an Interim Deal for the Doha Round Negotiation, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS, Dec. 29, 2005, 
http://www.asil.org/insights051229.cfm. 
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Yet this deadline lapsed and was replaced by another one (set for the end of 
June 2006),37 which also lapsed without meaningful development.38  On July 28, 2006, 
upon the Director-General’s recommendation, the WTO General Council 
suspended the negotiation due to irreconcilable differences among negotiators over 
three major trade barriers:  farm subsidies, farm tariffs, and industrial tariffs.39  
Without the announcement of any future negotiation schedule, the Doha Round’s 
future had plunged into uncertainty. 
C. So Close, Yet So Far:  The Demise of the 2008 Geneva Ministerial Conference 
Pascal Lamy declared the resumption of the stalled negotiation in February 
2007 after trade ministers from major WTO members informally gathered at the 
Davos World Economic Forum in January 2007 and recommitted themselves to 
further negotiations.40  As the year 2008 dawned, the agricultural negotiation 
emerged with some significant developments as the Chair improved the agricultural 
modalities text with each new draft, although the NAMA negotiation proved to be a 
tougher process.41  Chairs in both the agricultural sector, Crawford Falconer, and 
NAMA, Don Stephenson, issued a series of drafts in February, May, and July of 
2008 which identified areas of convergences and divergences.42  These drafts were to 
provide negotiators with simplified options for modalities.43 
When the WTO’s head, Pascal Lamy, summoned trade ministers to Geneva in 
the summer of 2008, many cautiously predicted a successful deal on modalities.44  
Most negotiators felt compelled to complete the Doha Round in the foreseeable 
 
37. Lamy Sets End-June Deadline for AG, NAMA Modalities, 10 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. 
(Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev.), May 31, 2006, at 1, available at 
http://ictsd.org/downloads/bridgesweekly/bridgesweekly10-19.pdf. 
38. World Trade Organization, ‘We Are Now in Crisis.’ Director-General to Try to Break Impasse, 
July 1, 2006, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news06_e/mod06_summary_01july_e.htm. 
39. Id.  See World Trade Organization, Talks Suspended: ‘Today There Are Only Losers,’ July 24, 
2006, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news06_e/mod06_summary_24july_e.htm (“The main blockage is 
. . . agriculture . . . market access and domestic support, [and] . . . non-agricultural market access . . . .”); 
World Trade Organization, General Council Supports Suspension of Trade Talks, Task Force Submits 
‘Aid for Trade’ Recommendations, July 27, 2006, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news06_e/ 
gc_27july06_e.htm. 
40. Pascal Lamy, Director-General, World Trade Organization, Informal TNC Meeting at the Level 
of Head of Delegation, Chairman’s Remarks, JOB(07)/12 (Jan. 31, 2007), http://www.wto.org/english/ 
news_e/news07_e/job07_12_e.doc. 
41. See Slow Progress on Industrial Goods Talks in Final Push to Ministerial, 12 BRIDGES WKLY. 
TRADE NEWS DIG. (Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev.), July 9, 2008, available at 
http://ictsd.org/downloads/bridgesweekly/bridgesweekly12-25.pdf (“Differences in the NAMA talks have 
proved especially stubborn.”). 
42. For a synopsis of these drafts, see Raj Bhala, Doha Round Schisms:  Numerous, Technical and 
Deep, 6 LOYOLA CHI. INT’L L. REV. 5 (2008). 
43. Chair of WTO AG Talks Says New Draft Text Will Simplify Options for Ministers, 12 BRIDGES 
WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. (Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev.), July 9, 2008, at 2, available at 
http://ictsd.org/downloads/bridgesweekly/bridgesweekly12-25.pdf.  Regarding the most recent Doha draft 
text, see World Trade Organization, The July 2008 Package, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/meet08_e.htm. 
44. Geneva Mini-Ministerial:  ‘Now or Never’ For Real This Time?, BRIDGES DAILY UPDATE (Int’l 
Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev.), July 21, 2008, at 1, available at http://ictsd.org/downloads/ 
2008/07/bridges-daily-update-21-july1.pdf. 
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future, especially considering the global financial turmoil.45  Nonetheless, once the 
actual negotiation began, the general pace turned out to be rather slow-going.  After 
days of negotiation, no clear signs of progress emerged.  At long last, on the sixth 
day, a ray of hope shone over the stalemated negotiation.  On the verge of collapse 
in the talks, Lamy managed to persuade negotiators to continue by presenting the 
critical “package of elements,”46 which might have been coined the Lamy Draft.  This 
deal-salvaging package was nothing more than a deliberate compromise proposal 
based on the most recent draft modalities on agriculture and NAMA. 
What Lamy did was to present some concrete headline numbers on several 
major sticking issues, such as farm subsidies and industrial tariffs, in an articulated 
fashion out of the intense consultations among the seven key negotiating parties 
(United States, the EU, Australia, Japan, China, Brazil, and India).  According to 
the Lamy Draft, the United States would cut the current bound level of farm 
subsidies ($48 billion) to $14 billion47 (which was still much higher than the actual 
spending in the previous year of $7 billion), and the EU would cut its farm subsidies 
by 80 percent, to approximately €22 billion.48  As to the market access, the Draft 
called for a 70 percent reduction for the highest farm tariffs (above 75 percent) of 
developed countries.49  At the same time, the Draft allowed developed countries to 
designate 4 percent of their agricultural tariff lines as “sensitive products” which are 
exempt from the aforementioned tariff cut.50 
Under the Draft, developing countries were also allowed to shelter 12 percent 
of all covered products (special products) from the normal tariff reduction.51  As to 
the special safeguard mechanism (SSM), developing countries could use it only when 
an import surges by more than 40 percent in volume.52  As to NAMA, coefficients, 
the maximum level of tariffs, would be 8 percent for developed countries and 20, 22 
or 25 percent for developing countries, depending on three different “flexibility 
mechanisms.”53  Developing countries could choose from these flexibility 
mechanisms to protect some of their strategic products more than others within 
these limits.54  Finally, the Draft proposed to hold the Services Signaling Conference 
to gather voluntary commitments in service-sector liberalization from developing 
countries in an effort to give some comfort to developed countries.55 
Frustratingly, this rather “unexpected momentum” soon evaporated as the 
United States wrangled with India and China over the SSM and cotton.56  India 
 
45. World Trade Organization, Day 1:  Ministers begin final effort to agree blueprints of deal, July 21, 
2008, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news08_e/meet08_summary_21july_e.htm. 
46. World Trade Organization, Lamy Presents “Package of Elements” from Consultations with 
Ministers, July 26, 2008, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news08_e/meet08_chair_26july08_e.htm. 
47. WTO Mini-Ministerial Evades Collapse, As Lamy Finds ‘Way Forward,’ BRIDGES DAILY 






52. Id. at 2. 
53. WTO Mini-Ministerial Evades Collapse, As Lamy Finds ‘Way Forward,’ supra note 47, at 2. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Disputes Threaten Doha Round, FIN. TIMES CHINESE, July 29, 2008, available at 
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maintained a recalcitrant stance against tightening the eligibility of the SSM, while 
China severely criticized the United States for pressuring it to open its cotton market 
as a condition to cut the U.S cotton subsidies.  On the ninth and final day of the 
talks, the core negotiating group (Australia, US, EU, Japan, China, India, and 
Brazil) and the G-33 bloc of food-importing developing countries (India, China, 
Indonesia, etc.) failed to close their gaps in some details of the SSM.57  Other than 
this holdup, the deal was close to completion because negotiators had managed to 
reach a consensus on nearly all other sticking points.58 
Jagdish Bhagwati blamed the United States as the “central spoiler” of the 2008 
Geneva Ministerial Conference.59  According to Bhagwati, the United States refused 
to significantly reduce its trade-distorting farm subsidies which are “universally 
recognized as intolerable,” while it attacked India for requesting enhanced 
safeguards for its mostly subsistent, rural farmers.60  Ironically, U.S. Trade 
Representative (USTR) Susan Schwab, at the time, probably did a service to the 
WTO since any deal sealed in Geneva but killed later in Washington might have 
dealt a more severe blow to the WTO.61 
The Doha Round talks entered into yet another dormant stage after the 
Geneva debacle of the summer of 2008.  Although during September 2009 in 
Pittsburgh, the G-20 leaders pledged, yet again, to conclude the Doha Round by the 
end of 2010,62 no genuine breakthrough, such as an agreement on the modalities, had 
been made by October 2009.63  The Geneva Ministerial Meeting in December 2009 
ended without any substantial progress, merely reaffirming the 2010 deadline.64  All 
in all, the Doha Round still remains a failure.65 
 
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001020872/en. 
57. WTO Mini-Ministerial Ends in Collapse,  BRIDGES DAILY UPDATE (Int’l Ctr. for Trade and 
Sustainable Dev.), July 30, 2008.  The United States insisted that an importing country might impose these 
emergency tariffs above the current WTO limits determined at the previous Uruguay Round only when 
imports increase more than by 40% over the preceding three years, while India wanted the trigger to be 
15%.  Daniel Pruzin, Trade Officials Voice Doubts on Push by Lamy to Revive Doha Round Talks, 25 Int’l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1256 (Sept. 4, 2008).  Yet India argued that with a 40% threshold the SSM would be 
inoperable “because India’s ability to monitor its imports of individual products is so haphazard that by the 
time the government detected a 40% import surge farmers would already be committing suicide en masse.”  
Paul Blustein, The Nine-Day Misadventure of the Most Favored Nations:  How the WTO’s Doha Round 
Negotiations Went Awry in July 2008, BROOKINGS INST., Dec. 5, 2008, at 10, available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2008/1205_trade_blustein.aspx.  Nonetheless, the United States was 
adamant with this 40% threshold, permitting no compromise; it also refused Pascal Lamy’s alternative 
proposal which would have replaced this numerical trigger with an expert review on “demonstrable harm,” 
which India accepted.  Id. at 15. 
58. World Trade Organization, Day 9: Talks collapse despite progress on a list of issues, July 29, 2008, 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news08_e/meet08_summary_29july_e.htm [hereinafter WTO, Day 9]. 
59. Jagdish Bhagwati, The Selfish Hegemon Must Offer a New Deal on Trade, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 20, 
2008, at 11. 
60. Id. 
61. See Blustein, supra note 57 (referencing Susan Schwab’s outburst at Lamy). 
62. Doug Palmer & Darren Ennis, G-20 Leaders Pledge Quick Action on Doha Deal, REUTERS, Sept. 
26, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE58O5MO20090925. 
63. Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Warns 2010 Deadline for Doha Hard to Meet without ‘Serious 
Acceleration,’ 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1414 (Oct. 22, 2009). 
64. See WTO Ministerial Lifts Hopes for Doha, But Scepticism Lingers, 13 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE 
NEWS DIG. (Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev.), Dec. 9, 2009, at 1–2 [hereinafter Scepticism 
Lingers]. 
65. The most recent attempt by negotiators to “take stock” until March 2010 to meet the end of 2010 
deadline seems to have faltered, darkening the prospects of completing the Round by the end of 2010.  See 
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III. REFLECTIONS ON DOHA’S FAILURE:  WHAT WENT WRONG? 
What caused Doha’s failure?  There may have been a unique context for the 
Doha Round which has militated against smooth negotiation in a consistent manner.  
For example, different expectations for the Doha Round between the North and the 
South may have complicated the entire process of negotiation.  Adverse election 
cycles in major economies, as well as the recent global economic recession, may have 
also rendered any concessions (liberalization commitments) politically unpalatable.  
Or, as a more immediate cause, an unfortunate discordant chemistry among major 
negotiators may have triggered the demise.66  At any rate, a sobering exploration of 
causes and contributing factors for Doha’s failure seems to be in order if we want to 
alter the direction of future trade talks toward a successful round. 
A. The Primary Cause:  Irreconcilable Agendas of Development and Mercantilism 
As discussed above, the Doha Round was meant to be a development round.  
The Doha Ministerial Declaration (2001) states that: 
International trade can play a major role in the promotion of economic 
development and the alleviation of poverty.  We recognize the need for all 
our peoples to benefit from the increased opportunities and welfare gains 
that the multilateral trading system generates.  The majority of WTO 
members are developing countries.  We seek to place their needs and 
interests at the heart of the Work Programme adopted in this 
Declaration.67 
However, the initial development focus of the Doha Round quickly blurred and 
faded.  Some observers from developed countries even believe that the development 
label tended to distance powerful stakeholders (businesses and industries) who 
might think the Doha trade talks would be mere charity and thus find little incentive 
to participate.68  They argue that developed countries basically perceive the Doha 
Round as yet another commercial negotiation in which could they can press for 
market opening by big developing countries, such as China, India, and Brazil.69 
For example, the United States conditioned the reduction of its farm subsidies 
firmly on other members’ concessions, not only on the EU’s reduction of farm tariffs 
but also on developing countries’ (such as China and India) disarmament of special 
 
Jonathan Lynn, Ministers Won’t Meet on Doha Prospects Soon, REUTERS, Feb. 19, 2010, 
http://in.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idINIndia-46329820100220. 
66. See Blustein, supra note 57, at 2 (depicting vehement negotiation styles of negotiators from major 
WTO members). 
67. Doha Declaration, supra note 4, para. 2 (emphasis added). 
68. See David S. Christy, Jr., ‘Round and ‘Round We Go . . ., WORLD POL’Y J., Summer 2008, at 19, 24 
(contending that “affixing the label ‘development’ to the Round may have warmed a few hearts, but it has 
not filled any bellies.”); Simon J. Evenett, What Can Researchers Learn from the Suspension of the Doha 
Round Negotiations in 2006?, at 5 (Univ. of St. Gallen Discussion Paper No. 2007-17, 2007) (observing that 
the ambiguous and confusing “development” mandate of the Doha Round discouraged corporate 
executives from attending WTO Ministerial Conference). 
69. Political Positioning Dominates Opening Day of WTO Talks, BRIDGES  DAILY UPDATE (Int’l Ctr. 
for Trade and Sustainable Dev.), July 22, 2008 [hereinafter Political Positioning Dominates]. 
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protection for their crops, even though this special protection was for non-
mercantilist purposes (such as food and livelihood concerns).70  While leaders of 
developed countries continued to advocate the vital cause of development, this 
rhetoric had little consequence at the negotiation table.71  In the meantime, 
developing countries refused to make concessions before developed countries tabled 
substantial commitments in the area of agricultural protection.72  It was this 
brinkmanship that frequently deadlocked the negotiation process.73 
At the heart of the North-South clash in the Doha Round laid the domestic 
politics of rich countries which simply could not accommodate the cause of 
development on political terms.  The heavily battered Bush administration was 
simply incapable of managing protectionist pressures from Congress in its lame-duck 
period.  In a highly symbolic gesture, in April 2007 fifty-eight U.S. Senators jointly 
sent a warning letter to U.S. President Bush stating that “our trading partners have 
refused to offer significant tariff reductions, and they insist on exceptions for 
sensitive and special products that will render meaningless the modest tariff 
reduction formulas they have proposed.”74  Likewise, Charles Grassley, a powerful 
U.S. Senator from a farming state, urged shortly before the collapse of the deal that 
the U.S. negotiators “pack their bags and come home” if other trading partners 
refused to grant U.S. businesses substantial market access in agricultural and 
industrial goods.75 
Mindful of these anti-trade sentiments in Congress, the USTR desired 
substantial concessions from trading partners and thus rejected any modest package, 
such as the “Doha-lite” proposal.76  Delegates from major U.S. special interest 
groups, such as the American Farm Bureau and National Association of 
Manufacturers, were actually stationed in Geneva as they monitored and even 
instructed U.S. negotiators.77  Such circumstances squeezed the negotiation space of 
the USTR who was preoccupied with the idea of sinking a deal in Geneva rather 
than failing to pass it in D.C.78  Naturally, these mercantilist stances by developed 
 
70. G-6 Ministers Agree to Work to Conclude Doha Round by End of 2007, 11 BRIDGES WKLY. 
TRADE NEWS DIG. (Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev.), Apr. 18, 2007, at 2 [hereinafter G-6 
Ministers Agree to Work]. 
71. See Alan Beattie, G8 Mood, supra note 28 (claiming that there was a “bizarre disconnect between 
the enthusiastic rhetoric from G8 leaders in Gleneagles on pushing ahead with trade talks and 
intransigence from negotiators that has brought the Doha round almost to a halt”). 
72. See Members Try to Convert Dalian Effort into Negotiations Breakthrough, 9 BRIDGES WKLY. 
TRADE NEWS DIG. (Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev.), July 20, 2005, at 2 (noting insistence by 
developing nations that some of their demands be met in agriculture before moving forward on NAMA, 
and citing “demands that the EU reduce subsidies and open its markets to foreign farm products”). 
73. See The Doha Round Cruising Along, FIN. TIMES, July 15, 2005, at 12 (claiming that brinkmanship 
would once have led to a last-minute deal, “but the sheer breadth of the current round of trade talks, 
coupled with the involvement of no less than 148 countries, forecloses that option”). 
74. Letter to George W. Bush, President, United States of America (Apr. 12, 2007), 
https://conrad.senate.gov/issues/statements/agriculture/070412_WTO_Ag_Letter.pdf.; see also Bhala, Doha 
Round Schisms, supra note 42, at 12 (discussing the provisions on special products). 
75. Doug Palmer, U.S. Farm Programmes Spared as WTO Talks Collapse, REUTERS, July 29, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUKL950898920080729. 
76. Sungjoon Cho, The WTO Doha Round Negotiation:  Suspended Indefinitely, ASIL INSIGHTS, 
Sept. 5, 2006, http://www.asil.org/insights060905.cfm. 
77. Blustein, supra note 57, at 11. 
78. Id. 
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countries irked developing countries.  Indian Commerce Minister Kamal Nath 
commented that rich countries pursued only “commercial prosperity.”79 
In particular, lavish farm protection in major developed countries, such as the 
United States and the EU nations, continued to undermine the DDA as the 
negotiation progressed.  Under the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, big agro-
businesses in France alone receive more than $10 billion a year.80  The EU’s biofuels 
policy created a tariff equivalent of 1,000 percent for controversial environmental 
benefits.81  In the United States, the renewal of the highly protectionist-oriented 
Farm Bill in the middle of the Doha Round negotiation disheartened many 
delegates.82  This ignominious bill, which “rewards rich farmers who do not need the 
help while doing virtually nothing to help the world’s hungry, who need all the help 
they can get,” was lambasted by some U.S. media outlets.83  As Victor Davis Hanson 
trenchantly observed, lavish farm subsidies in the United States are “transparent 
election-cycle harvests for farm-state politicians, who have small constituencies but 
exercise outsized national political clout.”84  In a six-year cycle, U.S. politicians have 
masqueraded this special interest legislation by phony rationalizations, as seen in the 
Freedom to Farm Act (1996), the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act (2002), 
and the Farm, Nutrition and Bioenergy Act (2008).85 
Farm protectionism in the United States and EU entails enormous distortion in 
the global crop market beyond the level which might be remedied through 
occasional WTO litigation.  The fixation by the G-33 bloc (food-importing 
developing countries) on the SSM originated mainly from rich countries’ highly 
subsidized, and thus cheapened, crop.86  Under these circumstances, “any opening up 
of agriculture would be doubly difficult politically because exposing one’s farmers to 
the impact of highly subsidized foreign producers is regarded as yielding to unfair 
 
79. Instant Analysis:  Implications of the Failure of WTO Talks, REUTERS, July 29, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUKL928387320080729.  Admittedly, South-South relations were not 
without tensions in the Doha trade talks.  For example, Brazil, one of the main agricultural exporting 
countries, criticized India for their  recalcitrant position on the SSM.  Gary G. Yerkey, World Bank 
President Offers Some Ideas for Reviving WTO Talks, Focuses on Poor, 25 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1218 
(August 21, 2008) [hereinafter Reviving WTO Talks].  Other agricultural exporting countries, such as 
Argentina and Thailand, also opposed a separate exception of “special products” under which importing 
countries can protect certain agricultural sectors for food and livelihood security and rural development.  
See also Jonathan Lynn, Developing Countries Split over WTO Farm Protection, REUTERS, July 27, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUKL748592720080728 (discussing the division between poorer countries 
over proposals for a new trade deal).  However, such tensions were negligible compared to deep-rooted 
North-South conflicts. 
80. Patrick Messerlin, A Doha Deal Would Aid Many European Farmers, FIN. TIMES, July 21, 2008, at 
9. 
81. Id. 
82. Missy Ryan, New Farm Bill Seen Adding Fodder for Trade Feud, REUTERS, May 11, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0953063020080511.  See David M. Herszenhorn, House Passes Farm 
Bill by a Veto-Proof Margin, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2008, at A19 (discussing the passage of the Farm Bill 
against the wishes of President Bush). 
83. See, e.g., A Disgraceful Farm Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2008, at A22. 
84. Victor Davis Hanson, Harvesting Money in a Hungry World, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2008, at A19. 
85. Id. 
86. G-7 Talks on Special Safeguard Mechanism Inconclusive as Blame Game Heats Up, BRIDGES 
DAILY UPDATE (Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev.), July 29, 2008, available at 
http://ictsd.org/i/wto/englishupdates/15018/. 
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trade.”87  The Uruguay Round outcome enabled developed countries to continue 
their old practice of lavish farm subsidies, but deterred developing countries from 
invoking the special safeguard mechanism under the Agreement on Agriculture for 
technical reasons.88  This frustrated developing countries, who now want to fix this 
imbalance in the Doha Round. 
In sum, different expectations over the Doha Round bred enormous tensions 
between the North and the South in the course of trade talks.  While the South 
basically demanded from the North unreciprocated disarmament in farm protection 
under the DDA, the North still wanted to use the reduction of farm protection, if 
any, as a bargaining chip for reciprocal concessions from the South in areas of both 
agricultural and industrial market access. 
B. The Secondary Cause:  The Sterile Environment for Trade Talks 
Apart from the aforementioned deep-rooted North-South tensions, a blend of 
adverse factors has undermined the odds for a successful round.  First, as most 
commentators noted, the recent domestic political situations of major negotiating 
parties, such as the United States, EU, and India, have not been amenable to trade 
concessions, leading to a general lack of political support for a deal.  Key elections 
were pending in the United States and India as delegates papered over the 
modalities.  To make things worse, the Wall Street-born financial crisis quickly 
spread throughout the world and froze global trade, brewing protectionist 
sentiments.  Amid this economic hardship, some politicians intensified their acerbic 
rhetoric against the Doha deal.  For example, French President Nicolas Sarkozy 
stated that the EU Trade Commission’s offer would destroy the European farm 
sector by reducing agricultural production by 20 percent and cutting 100,000 jobs.89 
Another negative factor was the absence of the U.S. government’s trade 
promotion authority (TPA), formerly known as “fast track authority.”90  Without the 
TPA, passing the Doha deal in Congress would have been a very difficult, if not 
impossible, task for the lame-duck administration.  The U.S. negotiators, stripped of 
the TPA, had to grab a deal which could impress Congress, but major developing 
countries, such as Brazil and India, could not simply concede such a deal without a 
serious reduction of U.S. farm subsidies.91 
Moreover, the U.S. proposal of cutting the trade-distorting subsidy to $15 
billion, if implemented, would have forced the United States to dilute farm 
protection bestowed by the new Farm Bill92 which had recently been passed over a 
 
87. Jagdish Bhagwati & Arvind Panagariya, How the Food Crisis Could Solve the Doha Round, FIN. 
TIMES, June 23, 2008, at 9. 
88. Political Positioning Dominates, supra note 69. 
89. Id. 
90. Business Roundtable, Trade Resource Center, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) Is an 
Important Tool, http://trade.businessroundtable.org/trade_2006/tpa/important_tool.html (last visited Feb. 
3, 2010). 
91. Bradley S. Klapper, Blame High, Confidence Low as WTO Heads into Another ‘Final Year’ for 
Free Trade Pact, ASSOC. PRESS, Dec. 7, 2007. 
92. Dan Looker, Harkin:  WTO Offer Could Affect 2008 Farm Bill Programs If Trade Talks Succeed, 
AGR. ONLINE, July 25, 2008, http://www.agriculture.com/ag/story.jhtml?storyid=/templatedata/ag/ 
story/data/1216993795055.xml. 
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presidential veto.93  This forecast seemed to have pushed the U.S. negotiators to 
resist loosening the trigger threshold of the SSM, which would have hampered U.S. 
farmers’ exports to emerging markets.94  Tom Harkin, chair of the U.S. Senate 
agriculture committee, made it clear that this proposal was conditioned on enhanced 
access for U.S. farmers to foreign markets.95 
IV. THE DOHA FAILURE AS THE WTO’S LEGITIMACY CRISIS 
The failure of the Doha Development Round is particularly ill-timed amid the 
global financial crisis.96  One recent study revealed that the global financial crisis will 
cut developing countries’ income by $750 billion before the end of 2009 and leave 
another 50 million people in abject poverty.97  Collateral damage to the world’s poor, 
such as the decrease of foreign direct investment and remittances, may last long after 
rich countries start recovering economically.98  A Doha success would certainly 
mitigate such developmental impacts to a great extent, considering that its 
agricultural package is two or three times larger than that of the Uruguay Round.99  
However, a Doha failure would reduce developing countries’ agricultural exports by 
11.5 percent.100 
It is also of serious concern that a systemic failure of the WTO—representing 
the well-operating multilateral trading system—could inflict suffering on developing 
countries.  The Doha failure is a WTO failure in that “commitment to free trade is 
weakening.”101  The Doha failure would embolden protectionism by generating a 
“public impression that whoever opens their markets loses.”102  Such sentiments have 
already emerged.  For example, the EU has recently decided to pour lavish export 
refunds (subsidies) on its dairy farmers, despite the fact that such subsidies are 
clearly against the current Doha agricultural draft.103  The EU, which had originally 
 
93. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, 7 U.S.C. § 8701 (2008); David Stout & David 
Herszhenhorn, House Override of Farm Bill Veto Is Only the 2nd in Bush’s Presidency, N.Y. TIMES, May 
22, 2008, at A24. 
94. Alan Beattie, Lamy Plan Spurs Optimism at Doha Talks, FIN. TIMES, July 25, 2008, at 5. 
95. Alan Beattie, US Offers to Reduce Farm Subsidy Limit to $15bn, FIN. TIMES, July 23, 2008, at 8. 
96. Dried Up, ECONOMIST, July 29, 2008; see Blustein, supra note 57, at 2 (observing that the 
“financial crisis has greatly magnified the import of [Doha’s] failure”). 
97. How to Rescue the Global Economy?, 13 BRIDGES MONTHLY (Int’l Ctr. for Trade and 
Sustainable Dev.),  Mar. 2009, available at http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridges/44278/. 
98. WTO Worried about Developing Economies, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Jan. 22, 2009. 
99. Peter Mandelson, Doha a Posteriori, in AGREEING AND IMPLEMENTING THE DOHA ROUND OF 
THE WTO 9, 9 (Harald Hohmann ed., 2008).  Under the current Doha package on the table, trade 
distorting farms subsidies will be cut by 70–80%.  Lamy, supra note 11. 
100. Antoine Bouët & David Laborde, The Potential Cost of a Failed Doha Round, 56 INT’L FOOD 
POL’Y RES. INST.  2 (2008), available at http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/ib56.pdf. 
101. Niall Ferguson, How a Local Squall Might Become a Global Tempest, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2008, 
at 9. 
102. Siobhán Dowling, WTO Failure Reflects Changing Global Power Relations, SPIEGEL ONLINE, 
July 30, 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,569027,00.html. 
103. Elisa Gamberoni & Richard Newfarmer, Trade Protection:  Incipient but Worrisome Trends, 
TRADE NOTES (World Bank Int’l Trade Dept.), Mar. 2, 2009, at 2, available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/239054-1126812419270/Trade_Note_ 
37.pdf. 
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planned to repeal such export refunds, took advantage of the legal vacuum created 
by the Doha deadlock.104 
Therefore, beyond any calculable welfare loss, the Doha failure might leave an 
irreversible systemic impact on the credibility of the WTO legal system.  As the 
Doha failure undermines the WTO’s legal shield, powerful countries tend to 
downplay the WTO’s authority.  This would be highly detrimental to less powerful 
developing countries.105  Under these circumstances, a small developing country’s 
victory against a big developed country in the WTO tribunal might seem to be less 
secure.106 
It is imperative to fully realize the symbolic and dynamic impact which 
delivering the development round could bring to the WTO.  Most quantitative 
studies on the welfare gains which a successful completion of the Doha Round might 
generate to developing countries are based on a rather static model.107  This is why 
some studies forecast fairly limited benefits to developing countries from a Doha 
success.108  However, such a model, by design, does not take into account long-term, 
institutional ramifications for development brought by Doha success.109 Such 
institutional ramifications include enhanced credibility of trade for economic growth 
in the LDCs, further political impetus for trade liberalization—both unilateral and in 
South-South trade liberalization—and increased domestic and foreign investment in 
these countries’ lifeline industries, such as agriculture.110 
In addition to the Doha Round’s importance in staving off protectionism during 
the current financial crisis, it is inextricably linked to the WTO’s moral agenda.  
Moral foundations for delivering the development round can be located in multiple 
sources.  The idea of a “duty to assist” less fortunate nations is established in well-
known literature,111 and has been applied in the trade context.112  Given what 
 
104. Peter Hunt, EU Subsidies to Wreak Havoc on Global Dairy Industry, WKLY. TIME NOW, Jan. 21, 
2009; EU Gives Boost to Dairy Exports, BBC, Jan. 23, 2009; David McKenzie & Simone Smith, 
Protectionism Is Back, WKLY. TIMES NOW, June 10, 2009 (quoting the Australian trade minister Simon 
Crean who stated that “if the Doha round is concluded, export subsidies will be eliminated”). 
105. Kimberly Ann Elliott, Does the Doha Round Matter?, 108 CURRENT HIST. 39, 42 (2009). 
106. Blustein, supra note 57, at 3. 
107. Lance Taylor & Rudiger von Arnim, Projected Benefits of the Doha Round Hinge on Misleading 
Trade Models, POLICY NOTE (Schwartz Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y Analysis), Mar. 2007, at 2, available at 
http://www.newschool.edu/cepa/publications/policynotes/Doha%20Policy%20Note% 
20Final%2003_12_07.pdf. 
108. See, e.g., EDUARDO ZEPEDA ET AL., THE IMPACT OF THE DOHA ROUND ON KENYA (2009) 
(predicting that a Doha success would bring a negligible or small  boost to Kenya’s GDP); Taylor & von 
Arnim, supra note 107, at 1. 
109. See Stephen Tokarick, Trade Issues in the Doha Round:  Dispelling Some Misconceptions (Int’l 
Monetary Fund Policy Discussion Paper), Aug. 2006, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ 
pdp/2006/pdp04.pdf (arguing that the World Bank’s forecast of small scale benefits to developing countries 
from the Doha success (US$20 billion in 2015) failed to fully appreciate dynamic effects of trade 
liberalization, which are hard to quantify). 
110. Tonia Kandiero & Léonce Ndikumana, Supporting the World Trade Organization Negotiations:  
Looking beyond Market Access, VOX, Nov. 27, 2009, http://vox.cepr.org/index.php?q=node/4295 
(observing that one of the benefits from the Doha Round to African countries is to “lock-in” domestic 
reforms). 
111. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 106 (1999) (“[W]ell-ordered peoples have a duty 
to assist burdened societies.”). 
112. See FRANK J. GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY, AND JUSTICE: TOWARD A LIBERAL THEORY OF 
JUST TRADE 107 (2003) (arguing for the special treatment of developing countries along Rawlsian lines, 
and advocating for S&D treatment as a solution).  But cf. Joost Pauwelyn, Book Review (reviewing FRANK 
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developing countries potentially stand to gain from a successful development 
round,113 it is important for developed countries to fully realize that developing 
countries’ effective access to the former’s markets is a critical ingredient for the 
latter’s development.114 
The moral failure of a Doha breakdown is further highlighted by the 
developmentally unsound outcome of the previous Uruguay Round.  Under the 
Uruguay Round, the concessions of developing countries (such as the inclusion of 
trade in services and trade-related intellectual property rights) materialized 
immediately, while those borne by developed countries (such as further 
liberalization in the areas of agriculture and textiles) “remained to be negotiated.”115  
The Doha Development Agenda was the widely accepted acknowledgement that the 
WTO system “owed something to developing countries.”116  The Doha Round, if it 
fails to address this unfair legacy, will leave an indelible mark of moral failure on the 
WTO. 
V. THE FUTURE OF THE DOHA ROUND AND BEYOND:  COULD 
DEVELOPMENT SURVIVE DOHA? 
A. The Exigency of a Doha Success 
Does the Doha Round have a future?  Can it ever be salvaged?  Considering 
the dire consequences that its permanent failure would likely bring, in particular to 
the WTO system itself, the better question to ask might be how, not whether, it can 
be saved.  The global trading community simply cannot afford an eventual Doha 
failure against the recent background of global economic hardship.  As global trade 
contracted in 2009 for the first time since World War II,117 a Doha failure would 
further discredit the WTO system and supply ample ammunition to politicians 
leaning toward protectionism. 
It appears that the timing, not the substance, of a deal will be the most decisive 
factor for any successful conclusion of the framework agreement on modalities, 
 
J. GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY, AND JUSTICE: TOWARD A LIBERAL THEORY OF JUST TRADE (2003)), 
37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 559 (2005) (criticizing Garcia’s application of Rawls’ difference principle to 
trade in terms of his focus on the allocation of natural endowments as ex ante disadvantages to developing 
countries, but agreeing with the premise that developing countries deserve special treatment and 
suggesting equal free trade, as opposed to S&D treatment, as a better solution).  The concept of a moral 
obligation between states in trade related matters is worthy of a much more detailed discussion but is 
beyond the scope of this article. 
113. See supra notes 107–10 and accompanying text. 
114. E.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Two Principles for the Next Round or, How to Bring Developing 
Countries in From the Cold, 23 WORLD ECON. 437, 452 (2000). 
115. Finger, supra note 18, at 87.  In the same context, a former Canadian trade negotiator, Sylvia 
Ostry, labeled the Uruguay Round deal as a “Bum Deal” for developing countries. Sylvia Ostry, 
Asymmetry in the Uruguay Round and in the Doha Round, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO, 
supra note 18, at 105, 105. 
116. Finger, supra note 18, at 90. 
117. See Open Markets Would Support Rebound in Trade in 2010, IMF SURV. MAG. (Int’l Monetary 
Fund), Jan. 13, 2010, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2010/SurveyartB.htm (indicating that 
trade volume fell by 18 percent). 
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which will guide each member’s efforts to articulate its own improved schedule of 
commitments.  Just remember how close negotiators were to a deal before 
negotiations suddenly collapsed at the eleventh hour in July 2008.  Pascal Lamy 
observed that out of twenty topics on the “to-do-list,” members’ positions on 
eighteen topics had converged before the 19th topic (the special safeguard 
mechanism) busted the deal.118  The very fact that the negotiation suddenly fell apart 
after members spent so much time and acquired substantial mileage signifies a lack 
of political will.119  Without recharged political capital, negotiators cannot seal the 
deal on modalities. 
Yet the current economic landscape tends to render any political initiative for 
free trade unpalatable.  First, the global economic crisis appears to have hardened 
key players’ intractable positions with regards to their wish lists.120  For example, the 
United States has continued to push the “sectoral” approach in industrial tariffs 
reduction, which it spearheaded in the July Ministerial in Geneva.121  Pressured by 
domestic interest groups, such as National Association of Manufactures (NAM), the 
United States desired to draw a substantial level of tariff reduction commitments in 
key sectors, such as chemicals, electronics, and industrial machinery, from major 
importing countries, including China.122  China also repeated its previous position, 
strongly opposing the U.S. approach, that participation in the sectoral liberalization 
program should be “voluntary.”123 
Second, every trade deal tends to inevitably accompany certain churning effects 
and therefore leaves domestic constituencies that will be negatively affected by 
increased competition from abroad.  Adding this trade-generated dislocation to 
recession-generated unemployment might be difficult for any government to 
implement.  Against this backdrop, having acknowledged that “there was no 
readiness to spend the political capital needed,” Lamy cancelled the pre-scheduled 
ministerial meeting in December 2008 where negotiators were supposed to deliver a 
breakthrough on modalities.124 
Nonetheless, forsaking the Doha Round at this stage is not an option since it 
would likely broaden the room for protectionism.  As discussed above, major 
governments have competitively responded to some of the consequences of the 
current economic crisis by simply relying on protectionist measures, such as 
subsidies.125  If left unchecked, this competition may turn into an ugly trade war, 
 
118. WTO, Day 9, supra note 58. 
119. Castle & Landler, supra note 3. 
120. Daniel Pruzin & Gary Yerkey, WTO’s Lamy Calls Off Doha Ministerial; Deal up to Obama 
Team, U.S. Official Says, 25 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1766, 1767 (Dec. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Pruzin & 
Yerkey, Lamy Calls Off]. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Daniel Pruzin & Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Refutes NAMA Chairman’s Report On Sectorals 
Agreement for Industrial Goods, 25 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1216, 1216–17 (Aug. 21, 2008). 
124. Pruzin & Yerkey, Lamy Calls Off, supra note 120, at 1766.  Unfortunately, major players, in 
particular the United States, found it hard to gather the political capital necessary to sell the Doha deal to 
recession-battered domestic constituencies.  See US Not Prepared for High-Level Doha Engagement Before 
Fall:  US Official, 13 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. (Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev.), Apr. 
1, 2009, at 11. 
125. See Blustein, supra note 57, at 2 (claiming that the economic downturn discouraged countries 
from removing trade barriers and subsidies); Simon J. Evenett, The Global Overview:  Has Stabilisation 
Affected the Landscape of Crisis-Era Protectionism?, in WILL STABILISATION LIMIT PROTECTIONISM? 
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invoking the old specter of economic balkanization on a global scale.  The conclusion 
of the Doha Round can effectively deter such proclivity of major members.  In fact, 
the news of a Doha deal will imbue a strong sense of hope in the global business 
community.126 
B. Preconditions for a Successful Round 
To resume the Doha negotiation, it is vital to mobilize necessary political 
capital both domestically and internationally.  Doing so will require monumental 
leadership from global leaders.  In particular, the United States is uniquely situated 
to offer such an important public good with a new president in office.127  As the 
world’s most powerful and affluent country and as the country responsible for 
engendering the current global financial crisis, the United States should recognize 
and shoulder its historic responsibility.  As President Obama stated in his inaugural 
speech, the United States has duties to the world which it “do[es] not grudgingly 
accept but rather seize[s] gladly.”128  Other major trading nations, such as Canada, 
Japan, and those of the EU should join the United States in a move toward bold 
trade liberalization.  In fact, to these countries trade liberalization means the saving 
of public money and the repealing of wasteful rent-seeking programs.  They are 
nothing but a form of domestic economic reform. 
True, the current economic landscape could complicate any trade deal.  For 
example, the U.S. special interests’ reciprocal demands from the Doha Round have 
intensified as the recession worsens.129  Yet the Obama administration should be 
more proactive in exercising political capital and leadership that the exigency of the 
current financial crisis has called for.130  The United States must embrace 
 
THE FOURTH GTA REPORT:  A FOCUS ON THE GULF REGION 17, 17–18 (Simon J. Evenett ed., 2010), 
available at http://www.globaltradealert.org/sites/default/files/evenett_gta4.pdf (observing that the recent 
sign of stabilization has not ended protectionism in major countries). 
126. World Trade Organization, “Ministers Continue to Attach Highest Priority to the Round’s 
Conclusion”—Lamy, Feb. 3–4, 2009, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news09_e/tnc_chair_report_ 
03feb09_e.htm (“Trade with its multiplier effect must be an integral part of the stimulus packages that are 
being adopted.  A successful outcome of the Doha Development Round can therefore be part of the 
solution to the economic downturn.”). 
127. See KINDLEBERGER, supra note 13, at 307 (describing such leadership as a “public good”). 
128. President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 21, 2009) (transcript available at  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/). 
129. See Claude Barfield, The Politics and Likely Trade Policies of the Obama Administration, 
Speech before the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Feb. 26, 2009) (transcript available 
at http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/events/bbl/09022601.html) (noting how current economic conditions have made 
parties less willing to negotiate); Doug Palmer, Business Groups Tell Lamy Need More from Doha, 
REUTERS, Mar. 24, 2009, http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE52N7KY20090324 (reporting the U.S. 
Congress’ resistance to the idea of resuming the Doha talks from the last year’s draft); Bruce Stokes, 
Rousing Doha from Its Doze, EUROPEANVOICE.COM, Feb. 12, 2009, http://www.europeanvoice.com/ 
article/imported/rousing-doha-from-its-doze/63918.aspx (observing that U.S. businesses view the summer 
2008 package as no longer acceptable). 
130. See Claude Barfield, What President Obama Can Learn from President Clinton, THE AMERICAN, 
July 15, 2009, available at http://www.american.com/archive/2009/july/what-president-obama-can-learn-
from-president-clinton (arguing that President Obama should abandon his ambivalent trade policy 
positions by disconnecting himself from anti-trade Democrats in the Congress as President Clinton did); 
Editorial, Tangled Trade Talks, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2009, at A18 (criticizing Obama’s reluctance to spend 
any political capital at home on trade). 
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multilateralism as a critical global public good over myopic parochial interests.131  If 
the United States provides constructive leadership and revitalizes the largely 
dormant Doha Round negotiation, WTO members can soon deliver a genuine 
breakthrough deal on the modalities, given the progress the negotiations have made 
thus far.132  Once WTO members conclude the modalities deal, the rest of the 
process, including the actual composition of national schedules based on the 
modalities and the subsequent verification, would be finalized rather expeditiously, 
potentially within several months.133  This means that WTO members can finalize the 
Doha Round by the end of 2010 or 2011.134 
Nonetheless, any attempt to ignore the penultimate deal in the summer of 2008 
as well as the whole modalities structure would gravely jeopardize the Doha 
Round.135  Reflecting the increasing impatience from the major U.S. export 
industries, U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk has recently floated the idea of 
skipping the modalities deal and instead directly conducting bilateral negotiations to 
generate market-opening concessions.136  This idea has gathered little support from 
other members, especially from developing countries, which fear being forced into a 
disadvantageous position in a bilateral setting with developed countries.137 
Likewise, it seems to be vital that WTO members preserve the original scope of 
negotiation and defy any unreasonable ambition regarding what the Doha Round 
talks might achieve.  In fact, the main reason why the last deal was so close in July 
 
131. See Antoine Bouët & David Laborde Debucquet, The Doha Round:  A Safety Net in Stormy 
Weather, VOX, May 14, 2009, http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3564 (arguing that “the WTO is an 
international public good that acts as an insurance scheme against potential trade wars”).  Cf. Doug 
Palmer, U.S. Trade Freeze Could Be Slowly Thawing, REUTERS, June 21, 2009 (citing Jeffrey Schott who 
observed that with the U.S. economy improved and its social safety net reinforced, Obama will be in a 
better position to promote free trade polices). 
132. See Roberta Rampton, ‘Like Waiting for Godot,’ WTO Awaits Next U.S. Move, REUTERS, May 
8, 2009, http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE54703V20090508?sp=true (discussing halt in 
progress on talks until United States determines how to proceed).  The WTO head Pascal Lamy observes 
that eighty percent of a Doha Round deal has been secured thus far (as of June 2009).  Welfare Payments 
Better than Trade Barriers—WTO Chief, REUTERS, June 4, 2009, http://in.reuters.com/article/ 
economicNews/idINIndia-40092320090604. 
133. See Shapi Shacinda, WTO’s Lamy Says Doha Deal in Sight, REUTERS, Apr. 7, 2009, 
http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE5360JJ20090407?sp=true (quoting Pascal Lamy who 
observed that it would take six or eight months to complete the round once WTO members agree on the 
modalities). 
134. Doha Talks Get New Energy at Cairns Group Meeting, 13 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. 
(Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev.), June 10, 2009, at 1 (observing that WTO members seem to 
have set a new deadline of the end of 2010 for the completion of the Doha Round).  See also G8 plus G5 
Agree to Conclude Doha in 2010, REUTERS, July 8, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
idUSTRE5665MK20090708 (“WTO chief Pascal Lamy said last month that a deal could be clinched in 
2010 because the mood of the negotiations had improved since the appointment this year of U.S. Trade 
Representative Ron Kirk and India trade minister Anand Sharma whose countries are seen as key to 
unlocking a deal.”); Day 1:  Ministers Target 2010 for Doha Conclusion, but Gaps Remain, BRIDGES 
DAILY UPDATE (Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev.), Dec. 1, 2009 (“Differences on substance 
notwithstanding, several countries have started to outline a potential process for concluding the round in 
2010.”). 
135. 2009 Trade Policy Agenda, supra note 6, at 4. 
136. Kirk’s Geneva Visit Signals US Engagement on Doha, 13 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. 
(Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev.), May 13, 2009, at 2. 
137. Bradley S. Klapper, New U.S. Trade Chief Finds Few Takers on Doha Plan, ASSOC. PRESS, Dec. 
7, 2000 (reporting on the vehement opposition to Kirk’s proposal to skip the modalities due largely to its 
potential effect on developing countries). 
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2008 was that Lamy was able to narrow down the zone of negotiation by excluding 
potential deal-breakers such as services, rules (antidumping), and geographical 
indications.  Although these issues have been technically part of the Doha trade 
talks, they do not belong to essential agendas, such as agricultural trade and 
industrial tariffs.  Those issues, albeit important to many members, have not fully 
ripened for a possible deal mainly because members’ positions diverge to a great 
degree and they often cannot agree on basic concepts.138  Under these circumstances, 
to force engagement on these issues may risk yet another collapse or provide 
recalcitrant negotiators with subterfuges for deal-blocking.139  One commentator 
aptly encapsulated the desirable path of the Doha Round as follows: “It is time to 
step back and build political support for a limited, scaled-down conclusion to the 
Doha Round and then plot a course for the long-term survival of the multilateral 
system and the WTO.”140 
C. With or Without Doha:  Developing Countries’ Own Initiatives 
As discussed above, developed countries’ leadership, in particular that of the 
United States, is vital in reviving the stalled Doha Round.  Given the state of 
negotiations, the United States could not avoid criticisms for the Doha failure both 
from the North and the South.141  Developed countries should realize that certain 
S&D treatments, which the special products exemption and the special safeguard 
 
138. Of course, this position does not necessarily restrict the WTO’s future agenda.  Regarding 
positions in favor of the expansion of the WTO’s agenda, see Pauwelyn, supra note 112 (evaluating 
Garcia’s claims that preferential trade schemes are unjustified because of their unilateral and conditional 
nature).  See also Aaditya Mattoo & Arvind Subramanian, A Crisis Calls for a ‘Crisis Round,’ WALL ST. J. 
ASIA, Mar. 25, 2009, at 14 (urging the launch of a “Crisis Round” of trade talks at the April 2009 G-20 
summit). 
139. See Sungjoon Cho, Constitutional Adjudication in the World Trade Organization 40 (Soc’y of Int’l 
Econ. Law, Working Paper No. 46, 2008), available at http://www.ssrn.com/link/SIEL-Inaugural-
Conference.html (observing widely diverging views on zeroing among negotiators).  See also Robert Wolfe, 
Use Transparency to Keep Trade Flowing, in REBUILDING GLOBAL TRADE:  PROPOSALS FOR A FAIRER, 
MORE SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 75, 75 (Carolyn Deere Birkbeck & Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz eds., 2009) 
(proposing not to “call for new items on the WTO’s over-loaded agenda”).  But cf. Mattoo & Subramanian, 
supra note 138 (proposing to replace the current Doha Round by a new “Crisis Round” which mainly 
targets new protectionism such as antidumping measures, government procurement, and climate change 
policies); Pauwelyn, supra note 138, at 572. 
140. Claude Barfield, The Doha Endgame and the Future of the WTO, VOX, Jan. 19, 2009, 
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/2806.  See also Paul Blustein, G20 Should Be Pragmatic about 
Protectionism, REUTERS, Mar. 30, 2009 (arguing that WTO members “should recast the Doha talks as an 
emergency anti-protectionism round” and postpone controversial issues); Doug Palmer, Remove 
Environmental Goods Talks from Doha:  U.S. Groups, REUTERS, Aug. 3, 2009 (reporting that U.S. 
businesses urged the Obama administration to remove the negotiation on environmental goods and 
services from the current Doha Round negotiation); John W. Miller & Peter Fritsch, Few Expect Progress 
on Doha at WTO Talks, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2009, at A14 (quoting Fredrik Erikson from the European 
Center for International Politics and Economy who observed that for a Doha success “trade ministers 
could jettison the idea of liberalizing trade in services, such as law firms and banking”). 
141. See, e.g., Francis Elliot, President Obama ‘Has Failed to Kick-Start World Trade Talks,’ TIMES, 
Dec. 2, 2009, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article6939446.ece (citing Gareth 
Thomas, the British top trade negotiator who criticized President Barack Obama for his failure to 
galvanize the Doha Round negotiations); India Blames U.S. for Delay in Doha Deal, TIMES OF INDIA, Dec. 
9, 2009 (criticizing the “non-serious” U.S. attitudes to the Doha Round talks in which it failed to appoint 
trade negotiators for the Round). 
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mechanism embody, are necessary for developing countries to cushion the overall 
liberalization impact on poor countries’ subsistence farmers and to address food 
security concerns.142  In fact, these S&D treatments do not significantly affect other 
countries’ gains from the Doha Round.143 
At the same time, however, developing countries, including low-income 
developing countries such as LDCs, should, on their own initiatives, mainstream 
open trade as their top development strategy and endeavor to integrate themselves 
to the global market, rather than relying solely on S&D treatments.144  “Retreat from 
openness would unacceptably delay the development transformation that developing 
countries sorely need.”145  This awakening may start from a sobering reality check on 
the genuine effectiveness of pre-existing S&D treatments for developing countries.  
While a garden variety of development assistance initiatives with different labels, 
such as S&D and aid for trade, may symbolize the development mandate within the 
WTO system, in particular under the DDA, their practical values are still 
questionable. 
First of all, the very concept of S&D treatment is obscure.146  While it may offer 
useful rhetoric, it fails to generate any concrete legal rights and obligations among 
WTO members.  The fact that even the Doha agenda calls for “more precise, 
effective and operational” S&D treatment147 is testimonial to its innate nebulous 
nature.  Yet such opacity, which certainly tends to jeopardize its effectiveness, 
cannot be easily fixed.  Some developing countries desire to convert the current 
hortatory structure of S&D treatment into a legally binding mechanism.148  However, 
 
142. John Nash & Donald Mitchell, How Freer Trade Can Help Feed the Poor, 42 FIN. & DEV., Mar. 
2005, at 34, 36, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2005/03/pdf/nash.pdf. 
143. SANDRA POLASKI, WINNERS AND LOSERS:  IMPACT OF THE DOHA ROUND ON DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES ix (2006) (submitting only a modest gain for developing countries from a Doha success).  Even 
among developing countries positions on special products tend to diverge between food-exporting 
countries (such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Costa Rica) and food-importing countries (such as Brazil, 
China, and India).  Daniel Pruzin, Latest Round of WTO Farm Talks Reveals Mixed Progress on SSM, 
Special Products, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1603 (Nov. 26, 2009). 
144. See Martin Wolf, Two-Edged Sword:  Demands of Developing Countries and the Trading System, 
in POWER, PASSIONS, AND PURPOSE:  PROSPECTS FOR NORTH-SOUTH NEGOTIATIONS 201–03 (Jagdish N. 
Bhagwati & John Gerard Ruggie eds., 1984) (describing developing country demands for special and 
differential treatment as a “two-edged sword,” implying that it eventually damages developing countries 
themselves via the destruction of free trade regime); Kym Anderson et al., The Cost of Rich (and Poor) 
Country Protection to Developing Countries, 10 J. OF AFR. ECONOMIES 227, 227 (2001) (finding that 
around sixty percent of all trade barriers in the global trading system originate from developing countries, 
not developed countries); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Bangkok, Thailand, 
Feb. 12, 2000, U.N. Doc. TD(X)/RT.1/2 (Dec. 3, 1999) (highlighting the importance of openness and non-
discrimination in light of reducing the opportunities for corruption and arbitrariness). 
145. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Two Principles for the Next Round or, How to Bring Developing Countries in 
From the Cold, 23 WORLD ECON. 437, 452 (2000). 
146. WORLD TRADE ORG. & ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., AID FOR TRADE AT A 
GLANCE 2009:  MAINTAINING MOMENTUM 39 (2009) [hereinafter MAINTAINING MOMENTUM], available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/aid4trade09_e.pdf (acknowledging that the scope and 
definition of aid for trade is not clear). 
147. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, para. 44, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746, 753 (2002). 
148. See Proposal for a Framework Agreement on Special and Differential Treatment 
(Communication from Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe), para. 15, WT/GC/W/442 (Sept. 19, 2001) 
(proposing that S&D treatment “shall be mandatory and legally binding through the dispute settlement 
system of the WTO”). 
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it is unlikely that such a drastic proposal would find supporters among other WTO 
members, especially developed countries.  In fact, this proposal goes beyond the 
level of S&D treatment: it touches on the very constitutional nature of the WTO 
system as a whole.  The current WTO structure would not permit such a far-reaching 
redistributive mechanism. 
The practical effects of S&D treatment are also controversial.  Non-reciprocal 
(free-riding) concessions from the North to the South may not necessarily be 
translated into poor countries’ effective access to rich countries markets.  Those 
products subject to reduced MFN tariffs may not match exports of low-income 
developing countries.149  For example, suppose that the U.S. import duties for 
passenger cars are reduced to zero due to the U.S. negotiation with South Korea in 
the WTO.  Even though Zimbabwe may theoretically benefit from such concession 
via the MFN principle, it will not practically help Zimbabwe since it does not 
produce and export any cars to the United States. 
Furthermore, developing-exporting countries should demystify unilateral 
preferential tariffs such as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and other 
regional preferential trade programs.150  Empirical studies demonstrate that real 
preferential values of those programs may be relatively small.  For sub-Saharan 
African countries, for example, such values are only four percent of their exports to 
the EU market and 1.5 percent to the U.S. market.151  Such shocking statistics may be 
explained by the facts that (1) many developing country products have low or non-
existent tariffs before the application of any preferences, (2) products with high 
duties are typically excluded from preferences, and (3) uncertainty surrounding 
preferences often dampen incentives to invest.152  Likewise, the U.S. Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI) strictly limits the import of sugar from Caribbean countries which 
earn more than a half of their foreign currencies from exporting sugar.153  The cost of 
compliance with those preferential programs, such as the rules of origin, is also quite 
high.154  According to Francois, Hoekman, and Manchin, these costs may amount to 
four percent of beneficiary countries’ total exports from preference regimes.155  
Finally, importers, not poor countries’ farmers or producers, may reap most of the 
 
149. Chantal Thomas & Joel P. Trachtman, Editor’s Introduction to DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE 
WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 1, 4–5 (Chantal Thomas & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009). 
150. Regarding an earlier argument in favor of MFN-based trade liberalization over trade 
preferences, see ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1987).  
From the standpoint of public choice theory, Hudec warned that trade preferences programs were 
vulnerable to capture and abuse in their arrangement.  Thomas & Trachtman, supra note 149, at 2. 
151. Tokarick, supra note 109, at 7–8.  See also DILIP K. DAS, THE DOHA ROUND OF MULTILATERAL 
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS:  ARDUOUS ISSUES AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES 95 (2005) (observing that the 
preference programs are rife with “restrictions, product exclusions and administrative rules”). 
152. See Paul Brenton & Takako Ikezuki, The Value of Trade Preferences for Africa, in TRADE, 
DOHA, AND DEVELOPMENT:  A WINDOW INTO THE ISSUES 223, 226–27 (Richard Newfarmer ed., 2006). 
153. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Dysfunction, Diversion, and the Debate over Preferences:  (How) Do 
Preferential Trade Policies Work?, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO, supra note 149, at 51–52.  
See also OXFAM, RIGGED RULES AND DOUBLE STANDARDS—TRADE, GLOBALIZATION, AND THE FIGHT 
AGAINST POVERTY 101 (2002) (pointing out the exclusion of sensitive products from liberalization under 
the U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act). 
154. Dunoff, supra note 153, at 53. 
155. Joseph Francois et al., Preference Erosion and Multilateral Trade Liberalization 8–11 (World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3730, 2005). 
10 Cho PUB 3/24/2010 5:50:15 PM 
596 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 45:573 
benefits from those preferential tariffs programs.156  In sum, it seems fair to say that 
the economic benefits of preferential programs have been disappointing in general.157 
A mercantilist assumption behind S&D treatment that no (reciprocal) tariff 
reduction somehow leads to development, as seen in the argument for the infant 
industry protection, remains debatable.158  Maintaining high tariffs may in fact harm 
developing countries since it deprives them of potential gains from domestic trade 
liberalization.159  As a matter of fact, this non-reciprocity tends to induce tariff peaks 
maintained by rich importing countries against main exports by low-income 
developing countries.160  Such “reverse S&D,” which refers to a number of 
exemptions from free trade principles that developed countries retain in practice, 
may outweigh any benefits from S&D treatment.161  This is nothing but a “Faustian 
Bargain”162 to developing countries:  it is developmentally pernicious because it 
undermines economic efficiency domestically (due to the maintenance of high 
tariffs) and impedes developing countries’ market access abroad (due to developed 
countries’ lingering tariff barriers to developing countries’ main exports). 
Most importantly, lowering tariffs for developing countries’ exports is not a 
panacea to their development.  A plethora of the so-called non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) or behind-the-border measures can effectively block the access of 
developing countries’ exports even after tariffs are eliminated.  For example, both 
the United States and the EU launched a large number of antidumping 
investigations against low- and lower-middle-income developing countries from 1995 
to 2008:  out of the 418 U.S. antidumping investigations, 179 were against low- or 
lower-middle-income developing countries; out of the 391 EU investigations, 208 
were also aimed at such countries.163  In a developmentally devastating pattern, these 
antidumping initiations have concentrated on those products in which low-income 
 
156. See, e.g., M. Olarrega & C. Özden, AGOA and Apparel:  Who Captures the Tariff Rent in the 
Presence of Preferential Market Access?, 28 WORLD ECON. 63 (2005) (explaining that while trade regimes 
like the AGOA purport to encourage trade and direct investment in LDCs they have the effect of 
benefiting importing industrialized countries rather than LDCs); Dunoff, supra note 153, at 54. 
157. U.N. Conference on Trade & Development [UNCTAD], Trade Preferences for LDCs:  An Early 
Assessment of Benefits and Possible Improvements, UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/2003/8 (Jan. 30, 2004); Dunoff, 
supra note 153, at 55. 
158. GROUP OF THIRTY, SHARING THE GAINS FROM TRADE:  REVIVING THE DOHA ROUND 55 
(2004). 
159. DAS, supra note 151, at 105.  There is also a collective benefit from trade liberalization: 
developing countries should open their markets among one another to fully achieve “export-market 
diversification.”  Id. at 106. 
160. Thomas & Trachtman, supra note 149, at 6. 
161. Ablasse Ouedraogo, Deputy Director-General, World Trade Organization, Closing Remarks at 
Seminar on Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries (July 3, 2000) (transcript 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres99_e/pr150_e.htm). 
162. BELA A. BALASSA, NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 360 (1989) (quoting Sidney 
Weintraub, who observed that the developed countries’ exclusion of most competitive exports from trade 
preferences was a price for non-reciprocal maintenance of tariffs retained by developing countries). 
163. These figures were derived from antidumping investigations data on individual countries from 
the WTO website after applying the World Bank’s list of low- and lower-middle-income economies.  
World Trade Organization, Statistics on Antidumping, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_ 
e.htm#statistics; World Bank, Data & Statistics:  Country Groups, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/ 
EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20421402~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSiteP
K:239419,00.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2010). 
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developing countries retain comparative advantages vis-à-vis developed countries, 
such as primary commodities and labor-intensive manufacturing goods.164 
Taxing regulatory standards in the areas of environment and food safety that 
are imposed by rich importing countries also hinder poor countries’ effective access 
to the former’s markets.  Most low-income developing countries, such as LDCs, 
simply cannot afford those sophisticated standards, nor do they have the necessary 
technology to meet them.165  More often than not, some rich countries’ prohibitively 
demanding standards, based on a zero-tolerance policy, unduly harm poor countries’ 
exports.  For example, the EU’s aflatoxin regulation, which is more austere than a 
relevant international standard, could reduce African food exports by over sixty 
percent, while it might save only 1.4 deaths per billion a year.166  These structural 
issues, such as capacity gap, cannot be fully addressed by S&D provisions alone 
without any serious redistributive measures such as financial aid and technology 
transfer. 
The aforementioned reality check offers a new perspective on the prospects of 
the Doha Round as a development round.  While the Doha Round’s developmental 
potential as it stands under the current proposed package may not be insignificant, at 
the same time one should not overestimate it.  Developing countries, in particular 
low-income developing countries such as LDCs, should look beyond Doha’s 
promises.167  Departing from the hitherto largely passive, recipient’s standpoint, 
developing countries themselves should take more active and innovative stances 
toward their development, with or without the DDA. 
First, developing countries may reconsider representing themselves in big 
groups, such as the G-77 or G-90.  Each developing country’s developmental agenda 
is unique.  A more targeted approach—country or product-specific—in the trade 
negotiation may prove more effective than a big group approach.  Here, a litigation 
threat under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism may boost individual 
developing countries’ leverage in the trade negotiation.   
Second, developing countries themselves should boldly embrace market 
opening168 and thus situate themselves in a better position to pressure developed 
 
164. Id. 
165. See generally STANDARDS AND GLOBAL TRADE:  A VOICE FOR AFRICA (John S. Wilson & 
Victor O. Abiola eds., 2003) (providing case-by-base analyses of the struggles Kenya, Mozambique, 
Nigeria, South Africa, and Uganda have experienced complying with regulatory standards). 
166. John S. Wilson, Standards, Regulation, and Trade:  WTO Rules and Developing Country 
Concerns, in DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, AND THE WTO:  A HANDBOOK 428, 431 (Bernard Hoekman et al. 
eds., 2002) (citing Sunehiro Otsuki et al., Saving Two in a Billion:  A Case Study to Quantify the Trade 
Effect of European Food Safety Standards on African Exports, 26 FOOD POL’Y 495 (2001)). 
167. See generally Sungjoon Cho, Beyond Doha’s Promises:  Administrative Barriers as an Obstruction 
to Development, 25 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 395 (2007) (arguing that developing countries’ exports are still 
subject to various non-tariff barriers, such as antidumping measures, rule of origin and regulatory 
standards, imposed by developed countries even though the Doha Development Agenda fully 
materializes). 
168. The 2002 U.N. International Conference on Financing for Development featured many speeches 
highlighting the essential role which open trade can play in achieving development.  These speeches were 
delivered by then World Bank President James Wolfensohn (stressing that all trading nations would 
eventually benefit from more open trade), IMF Managing Director Horst Koehler (describing trade as 
“the most import avenue for self-help”), and then WTO Director-General Mike Moore (pointing out that 
“poor countries need to grow their way out of poverty and trade can serve as a key engine of that growth”).  
Mixed Reaction on Trade in Financing for Development Outcome, 6 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. 
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countries to drop chronic protectionism, such as tariff peaks.  In particular, freer 
South-South trade, which many commentators on international trade have long 
advocated,169 is an essential component for development.  The developmental 
potential of some anecdotal South-South trade attempts, regional or plurilateral, 
appear to be largely limited in that they remain closed and exclusive.170  Possible 
export decreases due to preference erosion could be compensated by export 
increases of non-preferential products.171  Concomitantly, in what may be called 
“strategic liberalization,”172 a developing country should set its own trade 
liberalization course, including a case-specific liberalization sequence, modality, and 
speed,173 taking into account its own socio-economic context.174  Often, developing 
countries are compelled to restrict trade due to the lack of adequate adjustment 
assistance programs as well as certain policy concerns such as food security.  These 
inevitable restrictions should be regarded not as a mercantilist exemption but rather 
as a justifiable moderation in market opening, this is particularly true as long as rich 
countries’ lavish subsidies continue to distort the global market.175 
Finally, developing countries themselves, more than the WTO, should 
aggressively tap into development agencies, such as the World Bank and the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), to receive trade-
related technical assistance for capacity building.176  At the same time, donor 
governments may work directly with the developing countries’ private sector without 
the intermediation of recipient governments.  Developed countries’ manufacturers 
may then outsource their production to the private sector of developing countries.  
For example, in 2003 the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 
(NORAD), partnered with the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and 
 
(Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev.), Mar. 26, 2002, at 8. 
169. See Raj Bhala, Resurrecting the Doha Round: Devilish Details, Grand Themes, and China Too, 45 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 121 (2009) (agreeing with United States that South-South trade must increase; poor 
countries must lift themselves out of poverty in part by trading more with each other). 
170. See Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier between Regionalism and Multilateralism:  A New 
Perspective on Trade Regionalism, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419, 449 (2001) (observing that South-South 
regional trading blocks tend to generate only limited development impacts due to the lack of diversity in 
trade patterns). 
171. Tokarick, supra note 109, at 10; Mary Amiti & John Romalis, Will the Doha Round Lead to 
Preference Erosion? 4 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 06/10, 2006). 
172. Jim Redden, Introduction, in TRADE AND POVERTY REDUCTION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION:  
CASE STUDIES AND LESSONS FROM LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES 1, 19 (Andrew T. Stoler et al. eds., 2009) 
[hereinafter TRADE AND POVERTY REDUCTION]. 
173. Id. 
174. See Euan McMillan, The Economic Effects of Trade on Poverty Reduction:  Perspectives from the 
Economic Literature, in TRADE AND POVERTY REDUCTION, supra note 172, at 58–59 (observing that the 
effects of trade on developing countries are context-specific and depend on many non-economic variables 
such as history and geography).  This is also true in the area of development aid, such as the Aid for Trade 
program.  See MAINTAINING MOMENTUM, supra note 146, at 32 (emphasizing the notion of “country-
owned development”). 
175. B.S. Chimni, Some Reflections on the Idea of Free Trade and Doha Round Trade Negotiations, in 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 21, at 27–28 (Chantal Thomas & Joel P. 
Trachtman eds., 2009).  Governments of developing countries, such as India, are under severe political 
pressure against market opening from their subsistent farmers who fear the dumping of highly subsidized 
crops from rich countries into their markets.  See Delhi Trade Talks Face Familiar Foe as India’s Farmers 
Prepare to Protest, TIMES, Sept. 3, 2009 (indicating that an association of 50,000 Indian farmers would rally 
“to keep agriculture out of the WTO”). 
176. Supachai Panitchpakdi, The WTO, Global Governance and Development, in THE WTO AND 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE:  FUTURE DIRECTIONS 187, 200 (Gary P. Sampson ed., 2008). 
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Industry (FICCI), and invested in a pilot project to train Indian grape growers about 
a voluntary European agricultural standard (EurepGAP).177  Once these grapes, 
which are harvested in compliance with good practices prescribed by the EurepGAP, 
are certified, they can get access to the European market.178  Such public-private 
(state-to-business) technical assistance might be more effective than a public-public 
(state-to-state) one in that the former could cut red tape and directly benefit 
producers (exporters) in the developing world. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Doha Round, the longest trade round ever, is yet another constitutional 
moment for the global trading system.  How it ends may determine the way in which 
WTO members structure trade relations between each other in the future.  At the 
same time, however, this Round will exhaust neither development challenges nor 
responses thereto.  For the Doha Round to have any meaning for the future of the 
WTO, it is imperative that the rhetoric of the negotiation change from a mere 
commercial bargain controlled by major players to a public good whose institutional 
success benefits developing countries, which make up more than three quarters of 
the WTO membership.  The more WTO members subscribe to the rhetoric of 
commercial bargains, the further they tend to jeopardize the Doha Round itself.  
Although some members prefer to explore alternative venues for allegedly 
equivalent commercial deals, such as RTAs,179 they could not provide the same 
public good as the Doha Round, let alone their high costs to the global trading 
system.180 
The lack of the U.S. leadership in the Doha Round is evidenced by both its 
dispassionate engagement in the negotiation181 and insistence on the mercantilist 
balance in concessions.  Its trading partners, both developed and developing 
countries, now criticize in unison that the United States is the “main stumbling 
block” to the success of the Round.182  U.S. Doha leadership starts with the U.S. 
government’s resistance to domestic lobbies from special interest groups, such as big 
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agro-businesses and labor unions.183  Free from the myopic trade policy driven by 
rent-seekers, the U.S. government can reestablish its Doha goal from sealing a 
commercially attractive deal to helping secure a public good for the global trading 
system. 
In terms of a strategic choice, the United States should accept the so-called 
Doha-lite, which largely reflects the current negotiation package (agriculture and 
NAMA) on the table.  In particular, the United States may refrain from insisting on 
additional reductions of industrial tariffs from emerging economies (China, India, 
and Brazil).  Due to unilateral tariff reduction, these countries now actually apply 
much lower tariffs than their official bound levels.184  The United States argues that 
developing countries’ tariff cut concessions in the Doha Round should be based on 
these applied levels, not the bound ones.185  However, even the mere binding of the 
applied tariff levels by these developing countries in the Doha Round might be 
adequate, if not ideal, to seal the Doha Round.  After all, what is vital for the future 
of the WTO is to maintain the culture of openness among WTO members, not 
particular numerical levels of tariff cuts which may or may not satisfy certain 
powerful countries’ domestic constituencies.  As they have done in the past, these 
developing countries will continue to slash their tariffs for their own economic 
purposes once a Doha success affirms the solemn existence of a credible multilateral 
trading system.  This is why the United States should break from a narrow focus, 
defined by rent-seekers, and pursue a truly collective goal—delivering a 
development-friendly trade round. 
Concededly, it would be naïve to interpret an international negotiation like the 
Doha Round by a moral mandate only.  As the late Tip O’Neill famously stated, all 
politics is local,186 and parochialism is often powerful enough to stall and sink 
international trade deals.  Rightly, those impoverished foreign farmers would not 
cast a single vote for American politicians.  After all, isn’t it be a democratic virtue to 
respond faithfully to your own local constituency? 
The problem, however, is that “poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to 
prosperity everywhere.”187  Although the financial crisis started in the United States, 
it now wreaks havoc on the world’s poorest in a highly disproportionate manner.  
Poverty is one of the most horrible agonies, and it never comes alone:  it 
accompanies diseases, violence, conflicts, and wars.  From the insightful perspective 
of “comprehensive security” posited by Robert Scalapino,188 tanks and soldiers may 
be a necessary but insufficient condition for peace and security.  Genuine peace and 
security derives from global citizens who have a decent amount of food to eat and 
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decent kinds of work to do, which trade can provide.  The total financial burden of 
concessions necessary to help deliver Doha’s success would be trivial compared to 
astronomical military spending to keep the world safe. 
The completion of the Doha Round alone could never solve all the 
development problems that the WTO is facing.  Yet it is still an important step to 
fulfill the ultimate telos of the WTO—sustainable development—especially amid the 
current global economic crisis. 
 
